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1. Introduction
Game theory is the formal, mathematical methodology for
analyzing interactions between intelligent players: people,
corporations, software agents, or making decisions robots.
The theory is useful for solving problems in many disci-
plines, from economics, business, and law, public policy
to telecommunication. Game theory provides the tools for
determining optimal behavior in competitive environments.
Formally, a game refers to all the situations involving two or
more intelligent individuals making rational decisions [1].
The players are making decisions consistently to obtain the
assumed target. The player is considered intelligent, if he
knows the game rules and can make decisions based on his
knowledge.
The basic examples of game theoretical modeling include
the simulations of the competitive processes in economics,
political science, psychology, or biology. The players are
interest groups, politicians, or competing animal species.
Computer science uses game theory during modeling multi-
agent systems, online algorithms or processes in computer
networks [2].
Game theory is also useful in the cases where security is
important: in everyday life and security of the large-scale
IT systems such as computational grids and clouds. The
airport police behavior as one side of the conﬂict playing
against thieves or terrorists was modeled. Randomizing
schedules for patrolling, checking, or monitoring is typical
outcome of the models [3].
In this paper, authors focus on Stackelberg security mod-
els, where one or group of players are the privilege in the
game. They play ﬁrst, and the rest of the players follow the
leader(s) and make their decisions based on the leader’s
actions. Such games can be a good proposal for supporting
the decisions in the cloud systems, where security remains
a challenging research and engineering task. The existing
Stackelberg models related to the security aspects in high
performance computing telecommunication and transporta-
tion systems are surveyed and the models properties from
the implementation perspective are analyzed. The eﬀec-
tiveness of the models has been justiﬁed in realistic use
cases.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic
deﬁnitions and backgrounds of the game-theoretical mod-
els are explained together with the deﬁnition of the generic
Stackelberg game. In Sections 3 and 4 the secure Stack-
elberg game is deﬁned and the most popular Stackelberg
security models are reviewed. The computational and im-
plementation aspects of the analyzed Stackelberg models
are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6 the realistic use
cases for Stackelberg security games are presented. Sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper.
2. Game Theory – Backgrounds
and Game Models
Game theoretical models are very useful in the formal
analysis of task, data and information management and
decision-like processes in highly distributed large-scale
computational environments mainly because of the strict
mathematical formalism. Although, there are many types
of games and also many formal models of such games, the
most commonly used and known is the normal-form game
model introduced by Tadelis et al. [4] as follows:
Normal-form game consists of three sets: players, strategies
and payoﬀ functions speciﬁed for each player in order to
deﬁne the solution of the game for each combination of the
players’ actions.
Formally, the n-player normal game Γn can be deﬁned by
the following rule:
Γn = (N,{Si}i∈N ,{Qi}i∈N) , (1)
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where:
• N = {1, . . . ,n} is the set of players,
• {S1, . . . ,Sn} (card Si ≥ 2; i = 1, . . . ,n) is the set of
strategies for the players,
• {H1, . . . ,Hn};Hi : S1×·· ·×Sn →R;∀i=1,...,n is the set
of payoﬀ functions of the players.
The strategy of the player in the game can be deﬁned as
a plan of actions of that player to make the game beneﬁcial
for him. Two classes of strategies are deﬁned, namely pure
strategies and mixed strategies [4].
Deﬁnition 1. Pure strategy of the player i is the deter-
ministic plan of player’s actions during the game. The
set of all pure strategies speciﬁed for player i is denoted
by Si. A proﬁle of pure strategies in the n-players game Γn
is deﬁned by the following vector of the players’ strategies:
s = [s1,s2, . . . ,sn] ,si ∈ Si;(i = 1,2, . . . ,n). (2)
Such strategy proﬁle can be deﬁned for any combination of
the players’ pure strategies in the game Γ.
Deﬁnition 2. Let us denote by Si = si1,si2, . . . ,sim the ﬁnite
set of m pure strategies of the player i. Let us also denote
by ∆Si the simplex over Si. ∆Si is the set of all probability
distributions over Si.
The mixed strategy of player i is denoted by σi ∈ Si ⊂ ∆Si
and is deﬁned as follows [4]:
σi = {σi(si1),σi(si2), ...,σi(sim)}, (3)
where σi(si) is the probability that the player i plays ac-
cording to the strategy si.
One can conclude from the above deﬁnition that σi(si)≥ 0
for all i = 1, . . .N and
σi(si1)+ σi(si2)+ . . .+ σi(sim) = 1 . (4)
It can be also observed that the mixed strategy becomes
pure if σi(si j ) = 1 for some j σi(sik ) = 0 for all k 6= j.
In the mixed strategy model, the decisions of each player
are randomized according to the probability distribu-
tion σi(si). In such a case, the payoﬀs are also non-
deterministic.
Deﬁnition 3. Tadelis et al. [4] the expected payoﬀ of
player i in 2-players game is deﬁned as:
Hi(si,σ−i) := ∑
s−i∈S−i
σ−i(s−i)Hi(si,s−i) , (5)
where Hi(si,s−i) is the payoﬀ function calculated for the
player i. It is assumed in that game, that player i chooses
the pure strategy si ∈ Si and his opponents plays the mixed
strategy σ−i ∈ ∆S−i.
Similarly:
Deﬁnition 4. The expected payoﬀ of player i when he
chooses the mixed strategy σi ∈∆Si and his opponents plays
the mixed strategy σ−i ∈ ∆S−i is deﬁned in the following
way:
Hi(σi,σ−i) = ∑
si∈Si
σi(si)Hi(si,σ−i) =
= ∑
si∈Si
(
∑
s−i∈S−i
σi(si)σ−i(s−i)Hi(si,s−i)
)
. (6)
The main aim of each player during the game it to maximize
his expected payoﬀ by deﬁning the optimal strategy. The
most commonly encountered concept of the game solution
is an equilibrium point deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 5. An n-dimensional vector (s¯1, . . . , s¯n) of strate-
gies is called an equilibrium point or Nash equilibrium, if:
Hi(s¯1, . . . , s¯n)= maxsi∈Si Hi(s¯1, . . . , s¯i−1,si, s¯i+1, . . . , s¯n)
for all i = 1, . . . ,n . (7)
The Nash equilibrium [5] can be interpreted as a steady
state of the play of a strategic game, in which each player
holds correct expectations concerning the other players’
behaviors. If the strategies chosen by all players are
Nash equilibrium, no player is interested in changing his
strategy.
An n-vector ¯H =
(
H1(s¯1, . . . , s¯n), . . . ,Hn(s¯1, . . . , s¯n)
)
is
called a value of the game. The strategies (s¯1, . . . , s¯n)
are the pure strategies (see Def. 1). It means that they are
never changed during the game.
Some equilibrium points cannot be accepted as solutions
of the game. It is usually required that the solution should
not satisfy the following condition:
Deﬁnition 6. An n-dimensional vector of strategies
(sˆ1, . . . , sˆn) is Pareto non-optimal, if there exists another n-
vector (sˇ1, . . . , sˇn), for which the following two conditions
hold:
∀i∈{1,...,n} Hi(sˆ1, . . . , sˆn)≤ Hi(sˇ1, . . . , sˇn) , (8)
∃i∈{1,...,n} Hi(sˆ1, . . . , sˆn) < ui(sˇ1, . . . , sˇn) . (9)
One can say that the n-vector (sˇ1, . . . , sˇn) dominates
(sˆ1, . . . , sˆn).
It can be observed, that vector (s1, . . . ,sn) cannot be ac-
cepted as the solution of the game, if it is Pareto non-
optimal (even if it is the Nash equilibrium).
2.1. Minimization of the Game Multi-loss Function
The problem of detecting the Nash equilibrium of a ﬁnite
strategic non-cooperative game can be also formulated as
a global optimization problem with loss instead of payoﬀ
functions.
Let us deﬁne a set of loss (cost) functions for the players:
{Q1, . . . ,Qn};Qi : S1×·· ·×Sn →R;∀i=1,...,n . (10)
Each player tends to the minimization of his loss function
in the game, which is equivalent with the maximization of
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the payoﬀ function. Let us deﬁne a set of players’ response
functions {ri}i=1,...,n; ri : S1×·· ·×Sn →R where:
ri(sˆi) = argmin
si∈Si
{Qi(s1, . . . ,sn)}, (11)
where sˆi = (s1, . . . ,si−1,si+1, . . . ,sn). The response function
deﬁnes an optimal strategy for the player.
We can deﬁne now a multi-loss function Q : S1×·· ·×SN →
R for the game by the formula:
Q(s1, . . . ,sn)=
n
∑
i=1
[Qi(s1, . . . ,sn)−min
si∈Si
Qi(s1, . . . ,sn)
]
. (12)
Note that the multi-loss function has non-negative values.
In such a case, the Nash equilibrium is the result of the
global minimization of the function Q. The players’ strate-
gies are called the decision variables and the players’ loss
functions are called players’ objective functions.
It follows from the deﬁnition of the function Q that is
needed to minimize ﬁrst the loss functions of the players
and then to compute the values of the multi-loss function.
Thus the detection procedure of the Nash equilibrium is
a parallel algorithm composed of two cooperated units:
• main unit – which solves the problem of global mini-
mization of the function Q,
• subordinate unit – which solves the problems of
minimization of the players’ loss functions Qi.
The subordinate unit could be a parallel algorithm designed
for the numerical optimization of the real functions of
several variables.
2.2. Stackelberg Games
In all game scenarios considered in the Section 2, it was
assumed that the games are symmetric. It means that all
players have the same privileges and knowledge about the
game conditions and the other players’ strategies and ac-
tions. However, that assumption may never occur in the
real situations, where usually there is a player (or group of
players) with the deeper knowledge of the game conditions.
Cloud administrators and local cloud service providers
can be good examples of the realistic potential players in
non-symmetric resource allocation decision making game
model. In grid and cloud computing, Stackelberg games
are the most popular non-symmetric game models used for
supporting the decisions of various system users.
In Stackelberg game [6], one user acts as a leader and the
rest are his followers. The leader may keep his strategy
ﬁxed while the followers react independently subject to the
leader’s strategy. Formally, the N-players Stackelberg game
can be deﬁned as two-level game model, where the players
act sequentially as follows: (i) the leader is the only player
active at the ﬁrst level, he chooses his best-response strat-
egy; (ii) at the second level, the followers react rationally to
the leader’s action. It means that they try to minimize their
game cost functions subject to the leader’s choice. Finally,
the leader updates his strategy to minimize the total game
cost.
The solution of the Stackelberg game is called Stackelberg
equilibrium. In such a case, each follower observes the
leader’s strategy x and responds with strategy f (x) : x → y
that is optimal with respect to his expected payoﬀ. Two
types of Stackelberg equilibrium points can be deﬁned,
namely Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) and Weak
Stackelberg Equilibrium (WSE). SSE assumes that the fol-
lower breaks ties in favor of the defender. It means that
he chooses his optimal strategy, which is also optimal from
the leader’s perspective. WSE assumes that the follower
chooses the worst strategy from the leader’s perspective [7].
Formally, both scenarios can be deﬁned in the following
way:
Deﬁnition 7. A pair of strategies
(
x, f (x)) is deﬁned as
Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium if the following conditions
are satisﬁed [7]:
1. The leader plays his best-response strategy:
Hl
(
x, f (x)) ≥ Hl
(
x′, f (x′)) , (13)
for all leader’s strategies x′.
2. The follower plays his best-response strategy:
H f
(
x, f (x)) ≥ H f (x,y′) , (14)
for all follower’s strategies y′.
3. The follower breaks ties in favor of the leader:
Hl
(
x, f (x)) ≥ Hl(x,y′) , (15)
for all optimal follower’s strategies y′.
2.3. Bayesian Stackelberg Games
In Bayesian Stackelberg Game, the type of player must be
speciﬁed for each of N players. In two players game, there
is only one leader type, although there are multiple follower
types, denoted by l ∈ L. Authors deﬁne the probability pl
that a follower of type l will appear in the game. The
leader does not know the follower’s type. For each player
type (leader or follower) n, there is a set of strategies σn
and a utility function of the game Qn : L×σ1 ×σ2 → R,
which is usually deﬁned as the game cost function of the
given player n [8].
Bayesian game can be transformed into a normal-form
game using Harsanyi transformation. Let us assume there
are two follower types 1 and 2. Type 1 will be active with
probability α , and follower type 2 will be active with proba-
Table 1
Payoﬀ tables for a Bayesian Stackelberg game
with 2 follower types
c d c′ d′
a 2.1 4.0 1.1 2.0
b 1.0 3.2 0.1 3.2
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Table 2
Harsanyi transformed payoﬀ table
cc′ cd′ dc′ dd′
a 2α +(1−α),1 2,α 4α +(1−α),(1−α) 4α + 2(1−α),0
b α,(1−α) α + 3(1−α),2(1−α) 3α,2α +(1−α) 3,2
bility 1−α . A chance node must be speciﬁed for Harsanyi
transformation. That node is required for the speciﬁcation
of the follower’s type. It transforms the leader’s incom-
plete information regarding the follower into an imperfect
information game. In the transformed game, the leader
still has two strategies while there is a single follower type
with four (2 · 2) strategies [8]. That scenario is illustrated
in Tables 1 and 2.
3. Security Stackelberg Games
Decision processes of users, administrators and resource
owners in high performance computational systems are very
complex especially in the case, where security and data
protection are the important decision criteria. Game models
and Stackelberg games in particular, can be very useful in
supporting such diﬃcult decisions. The game models used
in security applications are called security games.
Security game is a game between defender and attacker.
The attacker may pick any target from the target set:
Targets = {t1, . . . ,tn} . (16)
The defender may cover targets by available resources from
the set of resources:
Resources = {r1, . . . ,rK} . (17)
Tambe et el. [9] deﬁned the compact security game model.
In this model, all resources are identical and may be as-
signed to any target and payoﬀs depend only on the identity
of the attacked target and whether or not it is covered by
the defender.
Any security game represented in this compact form can
also be represented in normal form. The attack vector A
maps directly to the attacker’s pure strategies, with one
strategy per target. For the defender, each possible allo-
cation of resources corresponds to a pure strategy in the
normal form. A resource allocation maps each available
resource to a target, so there are n Choose m ways to allo-
cate m resources to n targets [9].
Let us denote the defender utility if ti is attacked when it
is covered by Ucd (ti), and defender utility if ti is attacked
when it is uncovered by Uud (ti), and attacker utility U
c
a (ti)
and Uca (ti), respectively. Then, during the game, it is as-
sumed that adding the resource to cover targets beneﬁts the
defender and operates to the detriment of attacker:
Ucd (ti)−U
u
d (ti) > 0,Uua (ti)−Uca(ti) > 0 . (18)
For each resource ri there is a subset Si of of the schedules
S that ri can cover. The example of such a situation is
marshal’s ﬂy tours. In security game, the defender may play
best-response strategy, however, it depends on the attacker’s
behavior.
In normal representation of security game, the attacker’s
pure strategy is speciﬁed as a set of targets. The at-
tacker’s mixed strategy is deﬁned by the following vec-
tor a= [a1, . . . ,an] representing the probability of attacking
the targets. The defender’s pure strategy is deﬁned by the
coverage vector d ∈ {0,1}n , where di represents if target ti
is covered or not. Let us denote by D ∈ {0,1}n the set of
possible coverage vectors, and by c the vector of coverage
probabilities. The defender’s mixed strategy C is deﬁned
as the vector of probabilities of playing each d ∈ D. For
strategy C, the defenders utility is deﬁned as:
Ud(C,a) =
n
∑
i=1
ai
(
ciUcd (ti)+ (1− ci)Uud (ti)
)
, (19)
and attacker’s utility is deﬁned in the following way:
Ua(C,a) =
n
∑
i=1
ai
(
ciUca (ti)+ (1− ci)Uua (ti)
)
. (20)
In symmetric security games, the Nash equilibrium can be
also estimated. In such a case, the defender plays his best-
response strategy C, such that for any other strategy C′, his
utility is the most beneﬁcial:
Ud(C,a) > Ud(C′,a) . (21)
The attacker plays also his best-response strategy a, such
that for any other strategy a′, his utility is the most beneﬁ-
cial:
Ua(C,a) > Ua(C,a′) . (22)
The game model, in which the defender makes his decision
ﬁrst and attacker chooses his strategy based on the results of
the defender’s action, is called security Stackelberg game.
In that game, g(C) = a is the attacker response function.
Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) can be found by:
• the defender plays the best-response strategy C, such
that Ud(C,g(C)) >= Ud(C′,g(C′)) for all C′,
• the attacker plays the best-response strategy C, such
that Ua(C,g(C)) >= Ua(C,g′(C)) for all g′,C,
• the attacker breaks ties optimally for the leader:
Ud(C,g(C)) >= Ud(C,τ(C)) for all C, where τ(C)
is the set of followers best responses to C.
The basic version of the game assumes that utility func-
tions are common knowledge. In SSE (see Def. 7), the
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attacker must know the defender’s utility, in order to com-
pute his own strategy. In Nash equilibrium, the attacker
does not follow the defender’s actions. In real life applica-
tions, defender does not know the attacker’s utility function
and the game may be deﬁned by using the Bayesian model.
The assumption that attacker responds optimally (selects
the best-response strategy) may not happen either (imper-
fect follower case) [10].
4. Secure Stackelberg Game-based
Models
In this section, the most popular Stackelberg security game
models are surveyed. Presented models were selected due
to the increasing limitations on resources and growing at-
tackers’ number, incorporating uncertainty about the opti-
mal behavior of attackers, uncertainty about the observation
possibility.
4.1. DOBSS Model
Paruchuri et al. in [11] considered the Bayesian Stackel-
berg security game for one leader, multiple independent fol-
lowers and the situation when the leader does not know the
follower type. For leader strategy vector x = [x1, . . . ,xn] ∈
[0,1] represents the proportion of times when pure strategy
i = 1, . . . ,n was chosen. The authors proposed the algo-
rithm for ﬁnding the optimal mixed strategy for the leader,
under the assumption that the follower (attacker) knows this
mixed strategy choosing his own. The authors deﬁned the
following two utility matrices for the leader U i, jd = Ri, j and
attacker U i, ja =Ci, j . It is assumed that the leader plays pure
strategy i and attacker plays pure strategy j.
Let us denote by q = [q1, . . . ,qn] ∈ {0,1} the mixed strat-
egy for the follower, X – leader pure strategies index set,
and by Q – the pure follower’s strategy indexes. The algo-
rithm is implemented in the following steps (one follower
is considered):
• for ﬁxed leader strategy X the follower solves the
linear problem to ﬁnd his optimal response:
max
q ∑j∈Q ∑i∈X Ci, jxiq j , (23)
with constraints that means that every pure strategy
is possible:
q j>=0
∑
j∈Q
q j = 1; (24)
• the leader ﬁnds the strategy x that maximizes his
utility, under the assumption that the follower used
optimal response a(x):
maxq ∑
i∈X
∑
j∈Q
Ri, jq(x)xi , (25)
with assumption that each pure strategy is possible:
xi∈[0,1]
∑
i∈X
xi = 1 . (26)
The authors proposed also the model for multiple followers,
with speciﬁed recognition probability of the follower’s type.
Let us denote by U i, j,ld = R
l
i, j and U
i, j,l
a = Cli, j the utility
matrices of the leader’s respectively. Leader plays pure
strategy i and attacker plays pure strategy j, and the follower
type is l. Let us also denote by pl the probabilities of
playing with the follower of type l. The solution of such
a game can be deﬁned as quadratic programming problem
(speciﬁed for the leader) with the following distribution
over the follower type pl:
max
x,q,a ∑i∈X ∑l∈L ∑j∈Q p
lRli, jq
l
jxi , (27)
with the following leader’s and follower’s strategies:
xi∈[0,1]
∑
i∈X
xi = 1,
qlj∈[0,1]
∑
j∈Q
qlj = 1 . (28)
It can be observed that qlj = 1 only for a strategy that is
optimal for follower l:
0 =<
(
al −∑
i∈X
Ci, jxi <= (1−qlj)M
)
, (29)
where M is the ﬁxed large positive number, and a ∈ R.
In the above models, the players are completely rational
(they play according to the concrete calculated strategy) and
followers can follow the leader’s strategy. The quadratic
problem given by Eqs. (27)–(29) may be linearized by
deﬁning the new variables zli, j := xiq
l
j.
4.2. BRASS, BOSS and MAXMIN Models
Pita et al. in [12] proposed three mixed-linear program al-
gorithms for solving the Bayesian Stackelberg games. They
considered the following two game scenarios:
• bounded rationality of the followers scenario – the
leader cannot be sure that he will play the game
according to the calculated strategy with the selec-
tion ε-optimal response strategy – the follower may
choose any response,
• uncertainty scenario – the recognition of the leader’s
strategy by the follower can be incorrect.
In the ﬁrst case, the problem of solving the game was de-
ﬁned as the following BRASS linear programming prob-
lem:
max
x,q,h,a,γ ∑l∈L p
lγ l , (30)
where the leader’s and follower’s strategies can be speciﬁed
as:
xi∈[0,1]
∑
i∈X
xi = 1 , (31)
allowing to select more than one policy per follower type
∑
j∈Q
qlj >= 1, ∑
j∈Q
hlj = 1 , (32)
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and the condition that ensure that qlj = 1 only for a strategy
that is optimal for follower l:
0 =<
(
al −∑
i∈X
Ci, jxi <= (1−hlj
)
M , (33)
ε(1−qlj) =< al −∑
i∈X
Cli, jxi <= ε +
(
1−qlj
)
M , (34)
(1−qlj)M + ∑
i∈X
Rli, jxi >= γl , (35)
where hlj =< qlj, hlj,qlj ∈ {0,1}, for the ﬁxed large positive
number M and a ∈R.
In the uncertainty scenario model (BOSS), developed by
Jain et al. [12], the follower may not change the optimal
calculated strategy, but deviate from it. Instead of xi, the
follower plays xi + δi.
The authors proposed also the third MAXMIN model,
which is a simple combination of BRASS and BOSS mod-
els. The main aim in this model is to maximize the minimal
reword γ irrespective of the followers’ action:
max
γ ∑l∈L p
lγ l , (36)
where the leader’s and follower’s are deﬁned in the follow-
ing way:
xi∈[0,1]
∑
i∈X
xi = 1 , (37)
xi∈[0,1]
∑
i∈X
Rli, jxi >= γ l . (38)
4.3. COBRA Models
Pita et al. in [12] deﬁned following three game mod-
els: (i) COBRA(0, ε) model (bounded rationality),
(ii) COBRA(α , 0) model (observational uncertainty), and
(iii) COBRA(α,ε) model as the combination of (i) and
(ii). Parameters α and ε are two main parameters of the
games. For the real leader’s strategy x and follower’s strat-
egy x′, the problem of solving the game is deﬁned as the
linear problem x′i = α(1/|X |)+ (1α)xi. The value of α=1
indicates the player’s behavior in the situation of no knowl-
edge about the other strategies – any strategy is uniformly
probable. For α = 0 (full information available), x′i = xi
is the optimal strategy played by the follower. For α = 1,
x′i = (1/|X |) is the probability of playing the strategy x′i.
Using that model, the following problem as the game solu-
tion was formulated:
max
x,q,h,a,γ ∑l∈L p
lγ l , (39)
under the following constrains:
xi∈[0,1]
∑
i∈X
x′i = 1, ∑
j∈Q
qlj >= 1, ∑
j∈Q
hlj >= 1 , (40)
0 =< (al −∑
i∈X
Ci, jx′i <= (1−hlj)M , (41)
ε(1−qlj) =< al −∑
i∈X
Cli, jxi <= ε ,+(1−qlj)M , (42)
(1−qlj)M + ∑
i∈X
Rli, jxi >= γl , (43)
where x′i = α(1/|X |)+(1α)xi, hlj =< qlj, hlj,qlj ∈ {0,1}, for
M being the large positive number, and a ∈ R.
4.4. ORIGAMI Model
Kiekintveld et al. in [13] deﬁned the model in which the
attack set can be computed directly for the attacker in order
to cover target beneﬁts of defender and for the detriment
of attacker. Let us denote by C the coverage vector for
the defender selected the optimal strategy, and by ct the
probabilities that t-th target is covered. It is assumed, that
including any additional target to the attack set cannot in-
crease the players’ payoﬀs in the equilibrium states of the
game. Using indiﬀerence equation if Ua(C) = x then:
ct >=
x−Uua (ti)
Uca (ti)Uua (ti)
, (44)
for each target ti, such that
Uua (ti) > x . (45)
In the algorithm deﬁned for solving the ORIGAMI game
models, the target has maximal Uua (ti), and the attack set is
updated in each algorithm iteration for decreasing Uua (ti).
After each update of the attack set, the coverage of each
target is updated to reach the indiﬀerence of attacker payoﬀs
in the attack set.
4.5. SU-BRQR Model
Nguyen et al. in [14] modiﬁed the standard Stackelberg se-
curity model by introducing the following subjective utility
function:
ai = w1ci + w2Uua (ti)+ w3Uca (ti) , (46)
where w, w2, w3. The optimal strategy is calculated as fol-
lows:
max
c
n
∑
i=1
e(w1ci+w2U
u
a (ti)+w3Uca (ti))
∑nj′=1 e(w1c j+w2U
u
a (t j)+w3Uca (t j))
· . . . (47)
. . . ·
(
c jUca(t j)+ (1− c j)Uua (t j)
)
,
where
n
∑
i=1
ct <= K, 0 =< ct <= 1 .
In this model, the adversary has his own preferences ac-
cording to the importance of the rewords, penalties, and
probabilities. The authors recommended the maximum like-
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hood estimation method for estimating the game parame-
ters w1, w2, w3.
4.6. Eraser-C Model
Tsai et al. in [15] tried to simplify the standard security
Stackelberg game model. In their model, the payoﬀs de-
pend on the structure of the coverage set (the attacked target
can be its element or not). In this model the actions of the
players are deﬁned by the targets instead of coverage sets.
4.7. ASPEN Model
Jain et al. in [16] considered large, arbitrary schedules
in the Stackelberg security game. The main idea of their
model is to represent strategy space for defender using col-
umn generation, subcompositions into smaller problems,
and a technique for searching the space of attacker strate-
gies. The solution is dedicated for large number of defend-
ers of diﬀerent types.
4.8. GUARDS Model
Bo An et al. in [17] deﬁned the model for massive scale
games with hundreds of heterogeneous security activities,
reasoning over diﬀerent kind of potential threats. They
considered the situation when the defender has the possi-
bility of protecting targets by diﬀerent heterogeneous se-
curity activities for each potential target, and an adversary
can execute heterogeneous attacks on a target. In addition,
the defender is able to allocate more than one resource for
covering a given target. Moreover, the authors deﬁned the
defender’s uncertainty regarding the payoﬀ values of the at-
tacker, and uncertainty in the attackers’ observation of the
defender’s strategy. Pita et al. proposed model for heteroge-
neous security activities for each target and heterogeneous
threats for each target.
4.9. Multiple SSE Case
Tambe et al. in [18] deﬁned the game scenario, where the
attacker deviates from optimal strategy, with unknown ca-
pability constraints that may restrict the attack set. Authors
introduced equilibrium reﬁnement algorithm. In the case
of multiple SSE states, the developed algorithm is able to
choose the robust equilibrium for the most eﬃcient utiliza-
tion of the available resources. The idea is based on the
fact that if the vector of coverage c = [c1, . . . ,cn] generates
the SSE, then it is possible to ﬁnd another SSE by reduc-
ing coverage of targets outside the attack set. The authors
deﬁned the maximum attack set (MSSE) as:
M = {t ∈ Target s : Uua (t) >= Ua(c,a)} . (48)
They proved that any security game could not have two
maximum attack sets with diﬀerent attack sets. The authors
sorted target set using the values of utility function Uua (t)
in the following way:
Target ssorted = {t1, . . . ,tn} . (49)
The authors also developed the concrete algorithm for
computing the unique maximum attack set. It starts with
M = t1 and generates new targets in each iterated loop
(Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1: Computing the unique maximum attack set
i ← 0,M ←,Target ssorted
while i <= n do
if M = Target ssorted then return M
j ← i+ 1, M′ ← M∪{t j}, Target ssorted
while j > n and Uua (t j+1 = Uua (t j)) do
M′ ←M′∪{t j+1}, j ++
end do
if Condition C1 is true or C2 is violated for attack set M′
then return M
M ←M′, i ← j
end do
The following conditions were deﬁned for the above model:
• C1 – ∑
t∈M
ct <= m ,
• C2 – ct <= 1 for each t ∈ M .
4.10. Multi-step Attack MILP Model
Vorobeychik et al. in [19] considered the game scenario
when each attack may be realized in many steps and to be
completed it requires an arbitrary number (h) of such steps.
Mixed integer linear programming (MILP) formulation for
defender was proposed by discretizing the time unit interval
defender probabilities was spited into L intervals. Authors
proposed di, j,l as the binary variables such equals 1 indi-
cates a particular discrete probability choice pl ∈ [0,1] for
l = 1 . . . ,L−1 with p0 = 0 and PL = 1, such that only one
chose is possible, that is ∑l di, j,l = 1. Based on this idea,
new set of variables wi, j,l = di, j,lv j was introduced, where
v j is the expected attacker value of starting in state j. The
model includes the probability that a target j is visited in
exactly t steps, starting from i and the probability that j is
visited in 1 . . .h steps.
5. Computational Aspects
All secure Stackelberg game models surveyed in the pre-
vious section can be solved by the global optimization of
the game utilization function (loss or game payoﬀ) in the
same way it was deﬁned in Section 2 for the generic game
models. Such global optimization problems for Stackel-
berg security games can be deﬁned usually as special cases
of mixed-integer linear problems (MILP) or mixed-integer-
quadratic programming problems (MIQP). Depending on
the type of the game, such problems are of diﬀerent com-
putational complexity (Table 3). Such complexity can be
expressed by the number of control variables (strategies),
the number of leaders and followers and the number of
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uncertainty parameters in the game, which are estimated
by using the likelihood methods.
Table 3
The characteristics of surveyed Stackelberg models
Reference Size Value examined
[17] 5 / 20 Runtime, memory usage
[12] 50 / 200 Runtime, memory usage
[13] 3 / 8 Defender expected utility
[14] 9 / 24 Defenders expected utility
[20] 3 / 3 Pure strategies behavior
[12] 3 / 10 Runtime, expected rewards
[14] 3 / 10 Runtime
[11] 2 / 14 Runtime, speed up
The following theorem was proof according to the compu-
tational complexity of the problem [5]. In 2-player normal-
form games, an optimal mixed strategy to commit to can
be found in polynomial time using linear programming,
in 3-player normal-form games, ﬁnding an optimal mixed
strategy to commit to is NP-hard. Moreover, ﬁnding an
optimal mixed strategy to commit to in 2-player Bayesian
games is NP-hard, even when the leader has only a single
type and the follower has only two actions.
5.1. Equilibrium Points
SSE and NE equilibrium states (deﬁned in Section 2) are
the typical solutions for Stackelberg and non-cooperative
symmetric games. In Stackelberg security game, there is
however, the third type of equilibrium state, which can be
the most beneﬁcial solution of such game in many practical
applications.
Let us denote by ΩNE := a set of strategies played for
reaching the Nash equilibrium, and by ΩSSE := a set of
strategies for reaching strong Stackelberg equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 8. For a defender’s mixed strategy C and at-
tacker’s best response strategy E(C)=maxni=1 Ua(c,ti), a set
of defender’s minimax strategies is deﬁned as:
ΩM := {C : E(C) = E∗}, (50)
where E∗ = minC E(C) is the minimum of attacker’s best
response utilities over all defender’s strategies.
The following relations among these three types of equilib-
rium states can be speciﬁed:
• in a security game the set of defenders minimax
strategies is equal to the set of defenders NE strate-
gies, that is ΩM = ΩNE ,
• if C is the SSE strategy in a security game that sat-
isﬁes the property that for any recourse and any sub-
set of a schedule is also a possible schedule then
ΩSSE ⊂ ΩM = ΩNE .
Solving MILP and MIQP problems may be done by
one of traditional methods: simplex method, interior-point
methods, Conic linear programming, descent methods, con-
jugate direction methods or Quasi-Newton methods [21].
In addition a lot of new methods were developed re-
cently, from among them: relaxation method [22], Dantzig-
Wolfe decomposition [23], primal nested-decomposition
method [24].
5.2. Time of Solution Finding
All the Stackelberg security game models presented in Sec-
tion 3 cannot be compared to each other in the straightfor-
ward way, because they diﬀer according to the assumptions.
A simple summative analysis have been performed with
runtime, memory usage expected utility values, strategies
behavior and speed up as the main criteria. The results of
such analysis are presented in Table 4. The time that is
necessary for computing proper strategies depends on the
characteristics of the machine that was used for computa-
tion.
We can conclude from conducted simple analysis of the
surveyed Stackelberg game models that the strategy space
may exponentially increase with the number of security
activities, attacks, resources, and the time necessary for
ﬁnding the game solution.
Table 4
The time a for ﬁnding solution to the maximum problem
Reference/model Time [min] Size [targets]
[17] 8.2 250
[12] 116 200
[13] DOBSS 4.5 20
[13] ERASER 10.5 3000
[13] ORIGAMI 10.2 3500
[12] COBRA 7.5 8 followers
[12] DOBSS 11 8 followers
[14] BOSS 16.5 200
[11] 16.5 4
6. Use Cases
Stackelberg security games have been successfully imple-
mented in realistic large-scale IT systems for supporting
the system management and users and administrators de-
cisions. In this section the most interesting use cases for
such game models are reported.
The most spectacular implementation of the security
Stackelberg game model is the security system at the Los
Angeles International Airport. Randomizing schedules in
such systems for monitoring the system performance is
a critical issue. The main reason for that is the impor-
tance of the knowledge about the possible patrolling that
may cause terrorist attacks. This use case was realized as
a software-assistant multi-agent system called ARMOR
(Assistant for Randomized Monitoring over Routes). This
model supports the administrators and users decisions
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about the location of the checkpoints in the physical en-
vironment or canine patrol routes. The decision model is
based on the Bayesian Stackelberg games, in which the op-
timal mixed strategy is generated for the leader (patrol) and
the follower (terrorist) may know this mixed strategy when
choosing his own strategy in the game [9].
The next example of the practical Stackelberg game is the
strategic security allocation system in transportation net-
works (IRIS) used by Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS).
In transportation networks with hundreds thousands of ve-
hicles, police has to create patrolling schedules in order to
ensure safety. Aggressors can observe the law-enforcement
patterns and try to exploit generated schedule. IRIS sys-
tems use the fastest known solver for this class of security
games, namely ERASER-C [9].
Another Stackelberg use case is the United States Trans-
portation Security Administration system (TSA). The trans-
portation systems are very large and protecting them re-
quires many personnel and security activities. System sup-
ported the decisions how properly divide resources between
layers of security activities. In this type of game, TSA
acts as a defender who has a set of targets to protect,
a number of security activities and a limited number of re-
sources. The name of dedicated software system is Game-
theoretic Unpredictable and Randomly Deployed Security
(GUARDS) [9].
There are many applications of game theory in communica-
tions and networking. Using a variety of tools from game
theory, there was possible to ﬁnd new solutions in areas
related to cellular and broadband networks such as uplink
power control in CDMA networks, resource allocation in
OFDMA networks, deployment of femtocell access points,
IEEE 802.16 broadband wireless access, and vertical han-
dover in heterogeneous wireless networks [25].
7. Conclusions
Security Stackelberg games presented in this paper are very
promising tools for modeling the data and user manage-
ments, as well as supporting complex decision processes
in competitive computational environments with possible
conﬂicts of interests of the users and system administrators
and service and resource providers. All surveyed models
were based on the realistic characteristics of the systems,
namely existing limitations in access to the resources, un-
certainty about follower types, non-optimal behavior of the
players or limited knowledge of the opponents’ actions and
strategies. Increasing the eﬃciency of the game model is
strictly connected with the increase of the calculated num-
ber of parameters in the game and equations to solve in the
game optimization models, which makes of course the all
implementation of such models more complex.
Although, all optimization problems related to solving the
presented Stackelberg security games are NP-hard, the
practical use cases reported in this paper show the high
potential practical beneﬁts of using the presented games
in transportation systems in USA. It makes such models
a potential eﬃcient tool for supporting the complex deci-
sions in large-scale cloud environments, which will be the
next step of authors’ research on security aspects in cloud
computing.
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